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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
ON BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS AFTER 
KUMHO TIRE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (Kumho Tire),1 the U.S. Supreme Court 
shifted the sand under social scientific expert evidence when it held that the 
guidelines for determining the reliability of expert testimony, as described in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 apply to all expert testimony 
and are not limited to scientific evidence.3 This holding may significantly 
increase the number, if not necessarily the effectiveness, of challenges to the 
admissibility of expert testimony on domestic violence.4 That said, one 
should not overstate Kumho Tire’s immediate impact on the majority of 
cases involving expert testimony on the effects of battering, as most of those 
cases are adjudicated in state, rather than federal, courts.5 Nevertheless, it is 
 1. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). In Kumho Tire, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action against 
a tire manufacturer and distributor for damages arising out of injuries sustained in a vehicle accident 
when a tire failed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted 
summary judgment for defendants after ruling that plaintiff’s expert testimony that a defect in the tire’s 
manufacture caused the tire failure was inadmissible under the Daubert guidelines. The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s decision to apply Daubert and 
reversed and remanded the case, holding that the lower court “erred as a matter of law by applying 
Daubert in this case,” Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 (1997), rev’d sub nom. 
Kumho Tire v. Carmicheal, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), because the expert in question would be testifying to 
a “skill- or experience-based observation.” Id. at 1435-36. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s 
exclusion of the expert’s testimony, holding that the Daubert guidelines were not limited to scientific 
testimony but rather apply to all expert testimony. 526 U.S. at 149. Justice Breyer delivered the 
majority opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, 
Souter, and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens joined Parts I and II and filed a concurrence in part and a 
dissent in part. Justice Scalia filed a concurrence in which Justices O’Connor and Thomas joined. 
 2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (interpreting FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702). 
 3. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 138.  
 4. See infra Part III for a discussion of the contours of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS), 
Battered Spouse Syndrome, and other ways of framing expert testimony about the effects of battering. 
See also Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in Criminal 
Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 78-80 (1996) (criticizing the characterization of expert testimony on 
battering as “syndrome” evidence and urging a more sophisticated approach to integrating expert 
testimony about battering and its effects into already existing jurisprudence). 
 5. As this Recent Development will discuss, the Federal Rules of Evidence and federal court 
interpretations of the rules often have a strong influence on state courts. See source cited infra note 44. 
However, particularly with regard to the admissibility of expert testimony on BWS, state courts are 
less likely simply to adopt federal approaches because a majority of states have passed statutes 
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important to consider the admissibility of expert testimony on the effects of 
battering both because a small but significant minority of cases involving 
domestic violence are adjudicated in federal court and because federal 
approaches to the admissibility of expert testimony have had a significant, if 
uneven, influence on state approaches.  
Defendants have used expert testimony on the effects of battering in 
federal courts primarily to support claims of duress, coercion, or self-defense, 
while prosecutors have used it to explain victims’ behavior, such as 
recantations.6 Battered women have also proffered expert testimony to 
defend against charges of international and interstate kidnapping.7 
Furthermore, the significance of federal courts’ treatment of expert testimony 
on the effects of battering has increased as Congress has enacted an 
increasing number of laws that allow for the adjudication of what were 
previously considered state causes of action in federal courts.8 Although 
myths about battered women are still prevalent in the courtroom, expert 
testimony on domestic violence gives judges and juries more tools to 
overcome these prejudices.9 This Recent Development attempts to draw out 
explicitly admitting such testimony. 
 6. This Recent Development focuses generally on the admissibility of expert testimony on 
battering whether offered in civil or criminal trials. However, special considerations arise when a 
criminal defendant offers such testimony. See Katherine Goldwasser, Vindicating the Right to Trial by 
Jury and the Requirement of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Critique of the Conventional 
Wisdom About Excluding Defense Evidence, 86 GEO. L.J. 621, 623 (1998) (arguing that excluding a 
defendant’s evidence on grounds of unreliability interferes not only with a defendant’s right to present 
evidence, but also with a defendant’s right not to be convicted except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt and with a defendant’s right to trial by jury). 
 7. Interview with Jane Murphy, Visiting Professor, Washington University School of Law, in 
St. Louis, Mo. (Jan. 27, 2000). Cf. Blondin v. Dubois, 189 F.3d 240 (2d Cir. 1999). In Blondin, the  
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a father’s claim that the children’s mother was liable 
for international abduction where the trial court found the father was physically abusive to both the 
mother and children. Id. at 247. The mother conceded that she had “wrongfully abducted” the children 
under the relevent laws. Id. However, she established that the abduction fit an exception to the law 
requiring the defendant to show by clear and convincing evidence “a grave risk that [the child’s] return 
would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.” Id. Nevertheless, the court remanded the case for consideration of options for the return of 
the children to France under safe circumstances. Id. at 250. Although neither party presented expert 
testimony in Blondin, the case illustrates the potential usefulness of such expert testimony.  
 8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1), amended by Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (making the interstate violation of a protection order a federal offense). 
However, the Supreme Court has, at least in some cases, demonstrated hostility to Congress’s attempts 
to bring new causes of action before the federal courts. For example, in United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000), the Court held that Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce Clause 
to create a civil rights remedy for battered women as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 
(VAWA). Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1796, 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995)). 
 9. See Parrish, supra note 4; Audrey E. Stone & Karla M. Digirolamo, Battered Women’s 
Expert Testimony, Past and Present, 271 PLI/EST 181 (1998); Joy Hannel, Note, Missouri Takes a 
Step Forward: The Status of “Battered Spouse Syndrome” in Missouri, 56 MO. L. REV. 465 (1991). 
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the implications of Kumho Tire for admissibility challenges of expert 
testimony on the effects of battering. 
Kumho Tire is the most recent case that has reshaped the manner in which 
courts determine the admissibility of expert testimony under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.10 In 1993, the Supreme Court set forth general principles 
guiding determinations of the reliability, and, thus, the admissibility of 
scientific expert testimony in Daubert.11 The Court mentioned four factors 
that courts would ordinarily employ to determine admissibility under Rule 
702: (1) whether the theory can be tested, (2) whether the theory has been 
subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential error rate 
of the technique, and (4) whether the relevant scientific community has 
generally accepted the theory.12 Following Daubert, the circuit courts of 
appeals split as to whether the Daubert factors were limited to expert 
 10. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (interpreting FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 702). Cf. United 
States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 305 (1998) (holding that a per se rule against admission of polygraph 
evidence did not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights of the accused to present a defense 
despite Daubert). 
 In May, 2000, the Supreme Court approved an amendment to Rule 702 that became effective 
December 1, 2000. The new Rule 702 reads: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000).  
 The advisory committee’s note explaining the 2000 amendment specifically states that the 
amendment was proposed in light of recent case law, namely Daubert and Kumho Tire. See FED. R. 
EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. The advisory committee’s note also acknowledges additional 
gatekeeping factors such as whether proffered expert testimony is based on research that was created 
specifically for the purpose of litigation, whether an expert has reached an unsupported conclusion by 
unjustifiably extrapolating from an accepted premise, and whether an expert accounts for obvious 
alternative explanations. See id. See also William C. Smith, No Escape from Science, 86 A.B.A. J. 60, 
66 (2000) (noting that industry and defense groups endorsed the proposed amendment). The advisory 
committee’s note emphasizes that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception, not the rule under 
Daubert, that while all the Daubert factors are relevant to a reliability determination, “no single factor 
is necessarily dispositive,” and that the amendment is not intended to justify automatic challenges to 
all expert testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note. Regarding nonscientific testimony, 
the advisory committee note explains: 
While the relevant factors for determining reliability will vary from expertise to expertise, the 
amendment rejects the premise that an expert’s testimony should be treated more permissively 
simply because it is outside the realm of science. An opinion from an expert who is not a scientist 
should receive the same degree of scrutiny for reliability as an opinion from an expert who 
purports to be a scientist. 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (amended 2000). 
 11. 509 U.S. at 593. 
 12. Id. at 593-94. 
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evidence addressing the “hard” sciences or were also applicable to expert 
testimony regarding “soft sciences” and “nonscientific” knowledge.13  
In a related development, the Supreme Court, in General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner, enlarged the discretion of trial courts by adopting an “abuse of 
discretion” standard of review not only with respect to district courts’ 
ultimate reliability determination but with respect to the way in which district 
courts determine reliability—that is, the abuse of discretion standard was 
extended into the realm of the district court’s determination of the 
relationship between the reliability of scientific methodology and the 
reliability of scientific conclusions.14 Finally in Kumho Tire, the Court held 
that the principles of Daubert apply to all types of expert testimony and thus 
are not limited to “hard” scientific evidence.15 The Kumho Tire majority 
rejected unwieldy distinctions between “science” and “nonscience,” stating 
that there is no bright line between the two.16 
Since the ruling in Daubert, courts and legal commentators have voiced 
concern that the Daubert factors, specifically the focus on testability and 
error rates, may be difficult to apply to expert testimony in the areas of 
psychology and the behavioral sciences.17 Examples of cases involving 
 13. Compare, e.g., Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding 
application of Daubert not limited to scientific expert testimony), with Compton v. Subaru of America, 
Inc., 82 F.3d 1513, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding application of Daubert factors unwarranted “in 
cases where expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training”). 
 14. 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). See also Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142. 
 15. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 138. 
 16. Id. Indeed, Rule 702, even prior to the December, 2000, amendment, does not seem to call 
for sharp distinctions. “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise.” FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended 2000). See also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note 
(amended 2000). The Advisory Committee explained:  
The rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited 
merely to the “scientific” and “technical” but extend to all “specialized” knowledge. Similarly, the 
expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by “knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education.” Thus within the scope of the rule are not only experts in the strictest sense 
of the word, e.g. physicians, physicists, and architects, but also the large group sometimes called 
“skilled” witnesses, such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values. 
Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997). See also James T. 
Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 
JUDICATURE 10 (1995); Dara Loren Steele, Note, Expert Testimony: Seeking an Appropriate 
Admissibility Standard for Behavioral Science in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 48 DUKE L.J. 933 
(1999). See also Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 
JUDICATURE 77, 82 (1993). Jasanoff asserted that when judges are required to rule on the admissibility 
of expert testimony they “inescapably give up the role of dispassionate observer to become 
participants in a particular construction . . . of scientific facts” and in doing so “shape an image of 
reality that is colored in part by their own preferences and prejudices about how the world should 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss1/7
p367 rd Michelson.doc  7/17/01   5:22 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2001] ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BATTERING 371 
 
 
 
 
 
psychological testimony in which lower courts applied Daubert have borne 
out concerns that rigid applications of the Daubert factors may lead to 
sweeping dismissals of expertise from psychology and the social sciences, as 
well as expertise based on professional experiences.18 In response to 
concerns about mechanistic applications of Daubert, the Court in Kumho 
Tire reiterated that the factors in Daubert are meant to be “helpful, not 
definitive,”19 and emphasized that the factors “may or may not be pertinent in 
assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s 
particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.”20  
Following Kumho Tire, courts must wrestle with the implications of 
discarding the admittedly false dichotomy between hard science, soft science, 
and nonscientific knowledge. The fiction that clear distinctions exist appears 
surprisingly simplistic taken out of context. However, lower courts following 
Daubert argubly reified such categories in reaction to the limited and limiting 
notion of science adopted by the Court.21 While this demarcation did little to 
heighten the level of legal discourse about specialized knowledge, the 
distinctions may have protected useful evidence from possible exclusion 
under standards that appear to privilege the hard sciences at the expense of 
other disciplines. Against this background, the risks of deconstructing the 
distinction between science, soft science, and nonscience become apparent. 
Moreover, determining the reliability of “technical” knowledge, such as 
expertise based on applied physics, presents far different questions and 
challenges than determining the reliability of knowledge of human behavior. 
The question is whether the Court’s invitation to employ flexibility is 
adequate to bring about a consistent, principled approach to social science 
evidence. This is especially true in light of the interplay between the “abuse 
of discretion” standard of review—in which the Joiner Court appears to have 
qualified the position that district courts are to determine the reliability of 
methodologies, not of conslusions—and the fact that the Supreme Court has 
not endorsed any alternative criteria to balance the Daubert factors, which 
are particularly well-suited for the hard sciences as opposed to other “softer” 
sciences.22 
work.” Id. Therefore, she urged that this power “should be sparingly exercised.” Id. 
 18. See, e.g., Gier v.Educational Service Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994), aff’d, 
66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995). See also United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(Noonan, J., dissenting). Both of these cases are discussed infra Part IV. 
 19. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 150. 
 20. Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 19, Kumho Tire  (No. 97-1709)). 
 21. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598-601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 22. Numerous articles explore the implications of Kumho Tire. See Judge Harbey Brown, Eight 
Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Escape 
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This Recent Development examines the current status and the future of 
the admissibility of expert testimony on the effects of battering in federal 
courts.23 Over the past thirty years, the body of research on domestic violence 
has grown in depth and breadth. Courts have widely accepted the general 
idea that such testimony can be a trustworthy and helpful type of evidence.24 
However, as a component of the larger field of psychiatric, psychological, 
and social science research, knowledge of the effects of battering is 
potentially vulnerable in the face of some of the Daubert factors. Kumho 
Tire, which requires the application of a Daubert analysis to all types of 
expert testimony, raises the question of whether this adjusted focus on the 
admissibility of expert testimony will reopen what had been a relatively 
settled issue, the basic admissibility of expert testimony about the effects of 
battering. Because Kumho Tire requires that courts determine reliability on a 
case-by-case basis, this Recent Development is not concerned with drawing 
sweeping conclusions about the admissibility of all expert witnesses’ 
opinions on the effects of battering. Rather, the goal here is to explore the 
implications of the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire line of cases for the 
previously existing legal perception of expert knowledge regarding domestic 
violence. Part II reviews the historical development of the admissibility of 
expert testimony on the effects of battering and addresses the dilemma 
surrounding the continued use of the label “Battered Woman Syndrome” 
(BWS). Part III reviews recent Supreme Court rulings on the admissibility of 
expert testimony. Part IV presents approaches to psychological and social 
science evidence that courts had adopted prior to Kumho Tire and evaluates 
the continued legitimacy and vitality of these approaches. Part V analyzes 
cases in which federal courts have applied Kumho Tire to resolve challenges 
to the testimony of witnesses who are experts in the social and behavioral 
sciences. Part VI summarizes lessons gleaned from the cases considered in 
Parts IV and V in order to predict the likely influence Kumho Tire will have 
Hatches from Frye and Daubert: Sometimes You Don’t Need to Lay Either Foundation in Order to 
Introduce Expert Testimony, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1 (1999); Patricia A. Krebs & Bryan J. De Tray, 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: A Flexible Approach to Analyzing Expert Testimony Under Daubert, 
34 TORT & INS. L.J. 989 (1999); Steele, supra note 17; K. Isaac deVyver, Comment, Opening the 
Door but Keeping the Lights Off: Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert 
Test to Nonscientific Evidence, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177 (1999); Robert W. Littleton, Supreme 
Court Dramatically Changes the Rules on Experts, N.Y. ST. B.J., July/Aug. 1999, at 8; Robert F. 
Reilly, Implications of Recent Daubert-Related Decisions on Valuation Expert Testimony, S.C. AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., June 1999, at 28. 
 23. The focus here is on federal courts’ approaches to determining the reliability of expert 
testimony. Considerable diversity exists among state and federal courts regarding the purposes for 
which expert testimony on battering is admissible, for example, self-defense or duress. See Parrish, 
supra note 4, at 83. 
 
 24. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 83-87. 
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on the admissibility of expert testimony on domestic violence in federal 
courts. Part VII offers a brief conclusion about the potential contributions and 
limitations of the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire approach as applied to 
expert testimony on domestic violence.  
II. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BATTERING 
This Part describes the development of expertise on the dynamics and 
effects of battering and the history of the admissibility of expert testimony on 
domestic violence in state and federal courts. 
A. Evolving Knowledge: Redefining BWS in Light of Continuing Research 
 
 The recognition of domestic violence as a widespread social problem is 
quite recent.25 Shelters for battered women simply did not exist before the 
1970s.26 Legislatures, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors have 
implemented policies to respond to domestic violence in an uneven 
patchwork across the country.27 Similarly, organized research on the 
dynamics of domestic violence is a relatively new phenomenon.28 In 1984, 
psychologist Lenore Walker published her groundbreaking book on a 
model that she called the Battered Woman Syndrome.29 Based on her own 
research, Walker formulated her BWS model to explain the seemingly 
contradictory behavior of victims of domestic abuse and to counter myths 
and misconceptions about battered women.30 Although initally courts 
rejected attempts to admit expert testimony on BWS, finding that the 
 25. See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST 
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 182 (1987).  
 26. See id.  
 27. See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY 
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE (1988); PLECK, supra note 25; SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE 
VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (1982). 
 28. Research on domestic violence has now been proceeding for approximately the last thirty 
years. Recently, this research has received a new infusion of attention and funding with the passage of 
VAWA. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14013 (1995); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VALIDITY AND USE OF 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1996) [hereinafter DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE] (reviewing the theory, use, and acceptance of BWS in 
criminal trials submitted to Congress by interdepartmental working group of representatives from the 
Office of Policy Development, the Office of Justice Programs, the National Institute of Justice, the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics of the Department of Justice, the National Institute of Mental Health, the 
Administration for Children and Families, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation of the Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to § 40507 of VAWA, 42 
U.S.C. § 14013). 
 29. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter WALKER, BWS].  
 
 30. WALKER, BWS, supra note 29, at 1-2. See also LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 
(1979). 
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theory was not sufficiently developed and would not aid the jury,31 
numerous courts later admitted expert testimony on BWS for limited 
purposes in subsequent years.32 
While later research affirmed many aspects of Walker’s theory, her 
original BWS model proved to be overly rigid and contained a number of 
conceptual weaknesses.33 Since the late 1980s, numerous commentators have 
noted the need for a more representative articulation of the dynamics and 
effects of domestic violence. For example, Janet Parrish called for the use of 
new terminology: 
Many battered women’s advocates, experts and attorneys have 
expressed concern about the use of the term “syndrome” in connection 
with this issue. Although it may have been initially necessary to use 
the term to demonstrate the scientific validity of the proffered expert 
testimony and is a convenient way of describing a set of characteristics 
that are common to many battered women, the use of the term 
“syndrome” has also served to stigmatize the battered woman 
defendant, or to create a false perception that she “suffers from” a 
mental disease or defect (one court even referred to it as a “malady”) 
. . . Rather than perpetuate such inaccuracies, we use (and urge others 
to use) the generic, inclusive language utilized by many expert 
witnesses and in a number of state statutes on the admissibility of 
expert testimony on battering and its effects.34  
Nevertheless, as advocates and litigators convince the courts to hear evidence 
regarding the context of battered women’s lives, legislators, courts, and some 
 31.  See, e.g., Buhrle v. Wyoming, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981). 
 32. See Paula Finley Mangum, Note, Reconceptualizing Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: 
Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 593, 603-05 (1999). 
 33. Many proponents of the use of expert testimony on the effects of battering have heavily 
criticized the characterization in terms of what they see as an overly simplified BWS theory that 
perpetuates negative stereotypes of battered women and pathologizes predictable psychological 
reactions to abuse. In particular, critics call for abandonment of the framing of victims’ behavior in 
terms of “learned helplessness.” In general, critics object to the conception that battered women suffer 
from BWS as if it were a mental illness. See, e.g., DONALD A. DOWNS, MORE THAN VICTIMS: 
BATTERED WOMEN, THE SYNDROME SOCIETY, AND THE LAW (1996); EDWARD W. GONDOLF & 
ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED 
HELPLESSNESS (1988); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: 
A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993); Martha R. Mahoney, 
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991); 
Mangum, supra note 32; Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the Battered 
Women’s Syndrome, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 485 (1998). 
 34. See Parrish, supra note 4, at 82-83. 
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expert witnesses often continue to frame such evidence in the language of the 
BWS.35  
Writing after Daubert, David Faigman and Amy Wright foresaw a 
possible change in admissibility determinations involving expert testimony 
on BWS.36 Indeed, they celebrated what they saw as the inevitable fall of 
BWS.37 In The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of Science, Faigman 
and Wright echoed numerous critiques of the BWS model and explicitly 
acknowledged that the current state of expertise on domestic violence has 
progressed beyond the early explanations of BWS.  
Although the law has become fixated upon the syndrome model, many 
researchers are currently conducting excellent, sustained research on 
the psychology of both battered women and the men who batter them. 
Some of this work is relevant to legal decisionmaking and future work 
will undoubtedly provide substantial insights into the psychology of 
domestic violence.38  
 35. Some states have adopted the gender neutral terminology of “battered spouse syndrome.” 
See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (1999). It is worth noting that the reference to a spouse is also 
problematic, as battering does not occur exclusively in marriage. Moreover, this attempt at gender 
neutrality fails on two counts. First, “battered spouse syndrome” suggests an equivalence between the 
battering of men and women. While men can be victims of domestic violence, men are the primary 
aggressors in the overwhelming majority of battering relationships between men and women. 
Therefore, the neutrality of the language serves to mask the extent to which this is a crime visited upon 
women. Second, one of the main disadvantages of using an exclusively feminine referant is that it fails 
to acknowledge domestic violence in same-sex relationships. Nevertheless, substituting “spouse” for 
“woman” produces the same negative effect. 
 36. See David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of 
Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 69-71 (1997). Their disapproval of the BWS model focused primarily 
on weaknesses underlying Walker’s original research in the early 1980s. For example, Faigman and 
Wright emphasized how BWS plays into negative stereotypes of battered women and put women who 
do not precisely fit the initial BWS model at a disadvantage. See id.  
 37. Faigman & Wright, supra note 36, at 70-71. 
 
 38. Faigman & Wright, supra note 36, at 69. See generally DONALD G. DUTTON, THE ABUSIVE 
PERSONALITY: VIOLENCE AND CONTROL IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS (1998); JUDITH HERMAN, 
TRAUMA AND RECOVERY (1992); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN STUDY (1998); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING IN AMERICA: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN SURVEY (1998); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 28; Linda 
L. Marshall, Effects of Men’s Subtle and Overt Psychological Abuse on Low Income Women, 14 
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 69 (1999); Mindy B. Mechanic et al., Intimate Partner Violence and Stalking 
Behavior: Exploration of Patterns and Correlates in a Sample of Acutely Battered Women, 15 
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 55 (2000); Christopher M. Murphy & Sharon A. Hoover, Measuring 
Emotional Abuse in Dating Relationships as a Multifactorial Construct, 14 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 
39 (1999). See also JACQUELYN CAMPBELL, ASSESSING DANGEROUSNESS: VIOLENCE BY SEXUAL 
OFFENDERS, BATTERERS, AND CHILD ABUSERS (1995); Jacquelyn C. Campbell, “If I Can’t Have You, 
No One Can”: Power and Control in Homicide of Female Partners, in FEMICIDE: THE POLITICS OF 
WOMAN KILLING 99 (Jill Radford & Diana E.H. Russell eds., 1992); Desmond Ellis, Post-Separation 
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Relying on the availability of increasingly-reliable knowledge regarding 
the psychology of domestic violence, Faigman and Wright urge the 
application of the four Daubert factors, especially the testability and error 
rates. 
Faigman and Wright clearly intended only to criticize “one line of 
scientific inquiry into the psychology of domestic violence.”39 Indeed, there 
is much to criticize in the way courts have understood and applied BWS. 
However, what Faigman and Wright have missed is that the residual 
problems with BWS stem less from the science that now underlies such 
testimony than from judicial interpretations of the role of such testimony. 
Faigman and Wright dismissed claims that the Daubert factors are unsuited 
to the behavioral sciences.40 Faigman and Wright’s failure to conceive of 
how the Daubert factors privilege the hard sciences caused them to dismiss 
the possibility that rigid applications of the testability and error rate factors 
could exclude useful evidence on the effects of battering as well as outmoded 
versions of the BWS model. Therefore, Faigman and Wright’s 
unidimensional portrayal of BWS as distinct and isolated from the 
burgeoning knowledge about battering fails to address the complexity of the 
interaction between the experts and the courts.  
B. The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Effects of Battering 
Before and After Daubert 
Expert testimony on the effects of battering, in the name of BWS, debuted 
in the state courts,41 primarily because state courts hear the overwhelming 
majority of cases involving domestic violence.42 Although the Federal Rules 
of Evidence generally influence state rules of evidence, there is no simple 
Woman Abuse: The Contribution of Lawyers as “Barracudas,” “Advocates,” and “Counsellors”, 10 
INTL. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 403 (1987); Demie Kurz, Separation, Divorce, and Woman Abuse, 2 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 63 (1996); Aysan Sev’er, Recent or Imminent Separation and Intimate 
Violence Against Women, 3 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 566 (1997); Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, 
Spousal Homicide Risk and Estrangement, 8 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3 (1993). 
 39. Faigman & Wright, supra note 36, at 69 n.11. 
 40. In doing so, they characterize criticisms of the rigid application of the Daubert factors to the 
social sciences as simplistic statements that “studying human behavior is difficult.” Faigman & 
Wright, supra note 36, at 104. In response to this straw man of an argument, they argue that “[s]urely 
[the experience of battered women] is ‘easier’ to study” than DNA. Id. 
 41. See Ibn-Tamas v.United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979). In Ibn-Tamas, Dr. Lenore Walker 
testified at trial and the court applied the Dyas test. See id. at 631-39. 
 42. See generally Parrish, supra note 4; Steven I. Platt, Women Accused of Homicide: The Use of 
Expert Testimony on the Effect of Battering on Women—A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 25 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 33 (1995). 
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correlation between state and federal admissibility tests.43 While the majority 
of states have adopted rules mirroring Federal Rule of Evidence 702, only 
some of these states have also adopted the reasoning in Daubert.44 Others 
apply variations of the Frye “general acceptance” test,45 and many states’ 
approaches to expert testimony are in flux.46 For example, three months after 
the Supreme Court ruling in Daubert, the Supreme Court of Florida held in 
State v. Hickson47 that expert testimony on BWS was admissible. 
Interestingly, the Florida court relied on a test derived from Dyas v. United 
States,48 noting that the Dyas test encompassed the Frye test without 
mentioning the Daubert guidelines.49 Particularly in light of the fact that a 
large number of states have enacted statutes explicitly admitting expert 
testimony on BWS for limited purposes, similarities between state and 
federal treatment of expert testimony on the effects of battering should not be 
overstated.50  
Decided before Daubert, Arcoren v. United States51 was the first federal 
appellate case to consider the admissibility of expert testimony related to 
BWS under Federal Rule of Evidence  702.52 In Arcoren, the court admitted 
expert testimony on BWS in the prosecution of a defendant charged with 
sexual abuse to explain why the victim recanted her earlier testimony.53 The 
Arcoren court held that expert testimony on BWS satisfied the Frye 
 43. Federal Rules of Evidence and U.S. Supreme Court decisions on evidentiary issues only bind 
the federal courts. For surveys of states’ approaches to the admissibility of evidence and comparisons 
to federal standards, see Parrish, supra note 4; John W. Parry, Highlights & Trends, 23 MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 290 (1999). 
 44. See Parry, supra note 43, at 298.  
 45. See id. at 299. 
 46. See id. 
 47. 630 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1993). 
 48. 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977).  
 49. The court quoted the test as: 
(1) the expert is qualified to give an opinion on the subject matter; (2) the state of the art or 
scientific knowledge permits a reasonable opinion to be given by the expert; and (3) the subject 
matter of the expert opinion is so related to some science, profession, business, or occupation as to 
be beyond the understanding of the average layman.  
Hickson, 630 So. 2d at 174 (citing Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. 1977)). The Supreme 
Court of Florida held that expert testimony on BWS met the second and third prongs of this test. Id. at 
175. 
 50. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 563.033 (1999). See also Joy Hannel, Note, Missouri Takes a 
Step Forward: The Status of “Battered Spouse Syndrome” in Missouri, 56 MO. L. REV. 465 (1991); 
Matthew R. Niemann, Note, Missouri’s New Law on “Battered Spouse Syndrome:” A Moral Victory, 
A Partial Solution, 33 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 227 (1988). 
 51. 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1991). By the date of the 1990 decision, while BWS may have been 
relatively new to the federal courts, such testimony had become familiar in the state courts. See 
Parrish, supra note 4.  
 52. 929 F.2d at 1240. 
 53. Id. at 1239.  
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requirement of general acceptance within the scientific community: “[T]he 
theory underlying the battered woman syndrome is beyond the experimental 
stage and has gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant 
admissibility.”54 
Since Arcoren, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have held that 
expert testimony on battering and its effects is admissible.55 On occasion, the 
Supreme Court has also acknowledged the usefulness of expertise on the 
effects of battering, though these cases have not directly addressed 
admissibility standards.56 Despite the adoption of Rule 702 and the ruling in 
Daubert, courts have not generally applied the full range of Daubert factors 
to such testimony. Rather, courts most often focus reliability inquiries on the 
qualifications of the expert and the general acceptance of expertise on the 
effects of battering within the scientific and medical communities.57 Courts 
have been much more likely to exclude such evidence based on the particular 
 54. 929 F.2d at 1240-41 (quoting State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Minn. 1989)). 
Notably, in Arcoren, the defendant did not challenge the reliability or the general admissibility of 
expert testimony related to BWS. 929 F.2d at 1241. 
 55. See, e.g., State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970, 976 (Ohio 1990) (finding “that the battered woman 
syndrome has gained substantial scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility into evidence”); 
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 454 (Ky. 1999) (referring to “the emergence of the 
‘battered woman syndrome’ as a phenomenon scientifically accepted in the medical community” and 
by the Kentucky legislature); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) 
(holding expert testimony on BWS meets the New York and Frye standard for admissibility of expert 
scientific evidence). See also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE, supra note 28, at ix 
(“Of the 19 federal courts that have considered the issue, all but three have admitted expert testimony 
on battering and its effects in at least some cases.”); Parrish, supra note 4. Cf. State v. Copeland, 928 
S.W.2d 828, 838 n.2 (Mo. 1996) (en banc.) In Copeland, the court noted that at the time of trial, BWS:  
had not been recognized as a distinct psychiatric diagnosis found in the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III and DSM-III-R). 
The phrase “battered woman syndrome” appears to have been coined by Dr. Lenore Walker, a 
psychologist, and popularized by Dr. Walker’s 1979 book The Battered Woman and her 
subsequent appearances on television talk shows and newscasts. 
Id. 
 56. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 890-95 (1992). Justice 
O’Connor cited Lenore Walker along with other researchers to support the proposition that because of 
the prevalence of domestic violence, a provision requiring women to notify their husbands before 
proceeding with abortions is invalid because it would represent an undue burden on women’s choice to 
undergo an abortion. See also Neelley v. Alabama, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989) (Marshall and Brennan, J.J., 
dissenting). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented from the denial of a writ of certiorari based on 
Brady violations. Id. at 1020. Marshall and Brennan noted that in Neelley, the trial judge overruled the 
jury’s sentence and sentenced the petitioner to death, despite finding that the petitioner was 
substantially under the influence of her husband during the commission of the kidnaping and murder 
for which she was convicted. Id. Further, a clinical psychologist who testified as an expert at trial 
testified that the defendant “probably fits the battered women’s syndrome to the most severe extent 
that [she had] seen.” 488 U.S. at 1021. Cf. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (acknowledging 
use of expert testimony on the “battered child syndrome” in criminal trials). 
 57. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 249 (Ark. 1991); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 
A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).  
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use for which the testimony is being offered58 and related conclusions about 
the relevance of the testimony.59 The issue of reliability, in contrast, has not 
 58. It is helpful to analyze challenges related to the purpose for which the testimony is offered by 
noting the differences in the criminal defense, criminal prosecution, and civil contexts. See generally 
Goldwasser, supra note 6. Purpose-based exclusions are probably most problematic when they keep 
juries from hearing testimony in criminal defense cases. In United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596 (7th 
Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the exclusion of expert testimony on 
BWS where the purpose of testimony would be to support a duress argument. Id. at 599. The court 
emphasized that the decision was based solely on the lack of proper development of the argument 
below and the preservation of the points, stating: “We do not mean to minimize the significance of 
battered women’s syndrome, or to exclude as a matter of law the possibility that some battered women 
may be able to prove either coercion, duress, or inability to form a specific intent.” Madoch, 149 F.3d 
at 599. While the court cited cases holding against such a possibility, the court explicitly chose not to 
express an opinion on the issue. Id. See also United States v. Quintanilla, No. 97-10339, 165 F.3d 920 
(9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1998) (unpublished decision) (full text available in Westlaw) (holding district court 
did not commit reversible error by precluding expert from expressing an opinion on subjective 
perceptions stemming from BWS where the court did consider subjective vulnerability at sentencing 
and court admitted expert testimony regarding “the psychology of human behavior with a particular 
emphasis on battered women” and “objective evidence of [petitioner’s] fear and the circumstances she 
found herself in” during guilt phase of trial). Cf. Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948 (1984) (Marshall and 
Brennan, J.J., dissenting). Marshall and Brennan urged consideration of whether petitioner’s 
constitutional rights were violated when jury instructions placed the burden of proving the defense of 
self-defense on the defendant. Id. Here the trial record in which defendant was convicted of killing her 
husband contained substantial evidence of severe domestic violence including testimony on the effects 
of battering. Marshall and Brennan noted, “Although traditional self-defense theory may seem to fit 
the situation only imperfectly, the battered woman’s syndrome as a self-defense theory has gained 
increasing support over recent years.” 469 U.S. at 950 (citations omitted). See also Julie Blackman, 
Potential Uses for Expert Testimony: Ideas Toward the Representation of Battered Women Who Kill, 9 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 227, 228-29 (1986); Developments in the Law—Legal Responses to Domestic 
Violence (pt. V), 106 HARV. L. REV., at 1574 (1993). Cf. United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560 (8th 
Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held the exclusion of expert testimony about 
the suggestibility of small children to specific practices by people in contact with the children 
amounted to abuse of discretion. Id. at 578. The court analogized such testimony to expert testimony 
that an abuse victim’s symptoms are consistent with recognized syndromes including BWS. 100 F.3d 
at 573. 
 59. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772, 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding expert 
testimony on BWS was admissible as relevant to explain why victim would recant her story in a 
criminal prosecution); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 706 N.E.2d 289, 294 (Mass. 1999) (holding 
expert testimony on BWS and posttraumatic stress disorder was relevant evidence on the issue of the 
voluntariness of defendant’s confession to police where expert testimony was admissible under state 
statute and Frye standard). But see People v. Gomez, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In 
Gomez, the court held expert testimony regarding BWS was inadmissible. The court concluded that 
such testimony was irrelevant to any explanation of the victim’s recantation because the prosecution 
had not established that the victim “suffered from” the BWS. Id. at 108. The court based this 
determination on the conclusion that there was “no evidence” of a “‘battering’ relationship.” In fact, 
the court recounted numerous pieces of evidence that the relationship was emotionally and physically 
abusive. Id. at 103-04. The court reached this decision based on a misconception of the usefulness of 
expert testimony on the effects of battering in the case. The court believed such expert testimony could 
not be useful if the victim could not be diagnosed with BWS. Unfortunately, the court failed to 
understand that expert testimony may have been useful, not to explain why the victim was afflicted 
with a particular mental disorder, but to explain why someone subjected to violence by an intimate 
partner might be reluctant to cooperate with prosecutors. Gomez demonstrates the dangers of courts’ 
misconceptions about testimony regarding the effects of battering. Gomez suggests determinations 
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been among the most highly contested questions debated in the courts 
regarding expert testimony on the effects of battering since the 1980s.60 
III. A REVIEW OF RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES 
The holding in Kumho Tire that courts must apply a Daubert analysis to 
all types of expert testimony is deceptively simple. The nature and scope of 
the reliability analysis set forth in Daubert and refined in Joiner and Kumho 
Tire has allowed for a great deal of variation and, arguably, bias.61 An 
understanding of courts’ likely treatment of expert testimony regarding 
domestic violence requires an analysis of these seminal Supreme Court cases. 
A. Setting the Stage: Daubert and Joiner 
In Daubert, the Court considered the admissibility of expert evidence 
regarding medical causation based on a novel scientific methodology.62 The 
Daubert Court held that Rule 702 overruled the Frye test for reliability, 
which focused solely on whether the relevant scientific community has 
generally accepted the scientific method.63 Emphasizing that the Federal 
Rules of Evidence are rules of inclusion rather than exclusion, the Court in 
Daubert stated, “[A] rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement would be at odds 
with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of 
relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.’”64 Rejecting the Frye 
test, the Court held that trial court judges must ensure that all scientific 
testimony admitted is relevant and reliable. To this end, the Court suggested 
about the relevance of expert testimony appear to be the most open to bias. See Christine Emerson, 
Note, United States v. Willis: No Room for the Battered Woman Syndrome in the Fifth Circuit?, 48 
BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (1996) (criticizing decision that BWS testimony was irrelevant to defendant’s 
claim of duress). 
 60. This is not to say that “syndrome” evidence, in the aggregate, has not been hotly contested in 
the popular media. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, 
SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994). 
 61. Laura Etlinger, Comment, Social Science Research in Domestic Violence Law: A Proposal to 
Focus on Evidentiary Use, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1259, 1276-78 (1995). Etlinger identifies the potential for 
bias in social science research and in judicial decision making. Cf. Natalie J. Gabora et al., The Effects 
of Complainant Age and Expert Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 115 (1993) (finding that in simulation jurors believed a thirteen-year-old 
sexual abuse complainant was more credible than a seventeen-year-old complainant when all other 
factors were the same). 
 62. Specifically, plaintiffs’ moved to admit expert opinions based on unpublished reanalyses of 
epidemiological studies. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had 
upheld a lower court’s exclusion of the expert evidence based on a determination that the methodology 
had not been shown to be generally accepted by the scientific community as reliable. Id. at 584. 
 63. Id. at 587 (rejecting the Frye rule). 
 64. Id. at 588 (citations omitted). 
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a nonexclusive list of factors to be used in determining reliability including: 
testability, publication and peer review, error rates, and general acceptance in 
the relevant scientific community.65 
Written to address the sweeping exclusion of new scientific techniques 
under the general acceptance test, Daubert shifted the authority for 
determining the reliability of novel scientific methods from the scientific 
community to judges. While Daubert offered “some general observations” to 
federal judges to guide them in this newly defined gatekeeping role, the 
Court stressed that “[m]any factors will bear on the inquiry, and . . . [the 
Court did] not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.”66 The Court 
acknowledged that this expanded role for the judiciary called for restraint on 
the part of judges when it stated, “The inquiry is . . . a flexible one . . . [that] 
focus[es] . . . solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 
that they generate.”67 The majority further limited the proper gatekeeping 
role of judges by endorsing judicial reliance on the conventional devices of 
the adversarial system to address “shaky but admissible evidence.”68  
Despite the Court’s strong emphasis on the liberalizing influence of the 
Rules of Evidence, Daubert contained the seeds of a trend toward greater 
exclusion of expert testimony. The lack of clarity in Daubert led to a circuit 
split regarding whether the Daubert factors applied solely to scientific 
evidence or to all expert evidence.69 On one hand, the majority opinion 
contained language hinting at the broad application of the guidelines to all 
expert testimony.70 On the other hand, the Court derived its list of factors 
from a rather esoteric discussion of the nature of scientific knowledge and of 
reliability as a scientific concept.71 The concern voiced by some courts that 
the Daubert factors would inappropriately constrain the admissibility of 
nonscientific evidence suggests the limitations inherent in the Daubert 
Court’s choice of a traditional, conservative definition of science.72 For those 
 65. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.  
 66. Id. at 593. 
 67. Id. at 594-95. 
 68. 509 U.S. at 596-97.  
We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably 
on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. That, 
nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive 
search for cosmic understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes. 
Id. 
 69. See id. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist identified the question of whether the majority opinion applies beyond scientific expert 
testimony. Id. 
 70. See id. at 592.  
 71. See id. at 593.  
 72. See id. at 593 (citing K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF 
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courts that interpreted Daubert to apply to all expert testimony, the result was 
often, in effect, a privileging of the methodology of the hard sciences. 
Four years after Daubert, the Court broadened trial court judges’ 
discretion to exclude expert testimony by adopting an “abuse of discretion” 
standard to review admissibilty determinations in General Electric Co. v. 
Joiner.73 The Joiner Court endorsed an expansive approach to judicial 
gatekeeping, stating as follows: 
Respondent points to Daubert’s language that the “focus, of course, 
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions 
that they generate.” He claims that because the District Court’s 
disagreement was with the conclusion that the experts drew from the 
studies, the District Court committed legal error and was properly 
reversed by the Court of Appeals. But conclusions and methodology 
are not entirely distinct from one another. Trained experts commonly 
extrapolate from existing data. But nothing in either Daubert or the 
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion 
evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of 
the expert.74 
Justice Stevens, dissenting in part in Joiner, criticized this broad 
conception of the “abuse of discretion” standard, arguing that it would result 
in the exclusion of reliable expert testimony.  
Daubert quite clearly forbids trial judges from assessing the validity or 
strength of an expert’s scientific conclusions, which is a matter for the 
jury. Because I am persuaded that the difference between 
methodology and conclusions is just as categorical as the distinction 
between means and ends, I do not think the statement that 
“conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one 
another,” is either accurate or helps us answer the difficult 
admissibility question presented by this record.75 
Justice Stevens further observed that the excluded experts’ methodological 
approach in Joiner relied on the “weight of the evidence” for assessing 
causation. The district court, however, concluded that the expert evidence 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (1989)). 
 73. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).  
 74. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (1997) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The majority’s holding 
in Joiner was specifically integrated into the amendment to Rule 702. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000); 
see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (2000). 
 75.  522 U.S. at 154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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was insufficiently reliable by considering each piece of evidence in 
isolation.76 Thus, according to Stevens, the trial court’s opinion unjustifiably 
resulted in the exclusion of expert opinion based on a reliable “weight of the 
evidence” methodology, “not the sort of ‘junk science’ with which Daubert 
was concerned.”77 In the end, Joiner accentuated the exclusionary aspects of 
Daubert and raised the stakes in the debate as to whether courts should apply 
the criteria set forth in Daubert beyond the arena of the hard sciences. 
B. A Closer Look at Kumho Tire 
In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court addressed a trial court’s exclusion of 
an expert’s opinion regarding the reasons for the failure of a tire.78 The Court 
overruled the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that a Daubert analysis was 
inapplicable as a matter of law because the nature of the testimony was 
“technical” as opposed to “scientific.” The Court unambiguously stated “that 
Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general 
‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ 
knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ 
knowledge.”79  
The majority reinforced the flexibility that the Daubert Court had 
previously emphasized. Indeed, the language in Kumho Tire suggests even 
more leeway than was explicit in Daubert, spelling out the possibility of 
choosing only one of the factors, or even discarding all the specifically listed 
factors, depending on the expert testimony at hand.80 However, reflecting the 
influence of Joiner, the Court framed its emphasis on the flexibility of the 
Daubert analysis in terms of the trial court’s “broad latitude,” stating that 
“the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to 
 76. See id. at 153 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Initially, the trial court excluded the testimony reasoning that all the specific Daubert factors 
argued against the reliability of the expert’s methodology. 526 U.S. at 137. On plaintiff’s motion 
challenging the rigidity of the trial court’s application of the Daubert factors, the trial court agreed that 
Daubert must be applied flexibly and conceded that the expert’s general methodology was widely 
accepted for some purposes, but, nevertheless, held that the specific analysis employed by the expert 
was not sufficiently reliable. See id. 
 79. Id. at 141. 
 80. Id.  
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that 
Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s reliability. But, as the 
Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and Daubert’s list of specific factors 
neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or every case. 
Id. 
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determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability 
determination.”81  
The Court declined to draw any generalizations about the applicability of 
particular factors to certain types of evidence. 
[W]e can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the 
applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we do so for 
subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of 
evidence. Too much depends upon the particular circumstances of the 
particular case at issue.82 
Certainly, the Court had reason to avoid sweeping dicta. However, this 
cautious approach differs sharply from the Court’s willingness to set forth the 
four factors in Daubert. Instead, the Kumho Tire majority offered two 
illustrative anecdotes.83 Each example referenced, at most, two of the 
Daubert factors. 
[S]ome of Daubert’s questions can help to evaluate the reliability even 
of experience-based testimony. In certain cases, it will be appropriate 
for the trial judge to ask, for example, how often an engineering 
expert’s experience-based methodology has produced erroneous 
results, or whether such a method is generally accepted in the relevant 
engineering community. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask 
even of a witness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, 
a perfume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff, 
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would 
recognize as acceptable.84 
The opinion reframed the purpose underlying the Daubert guidelines and 
articulated a concept of reliability closely related to the general acceptance 
test. However, rather than focusing on the general acceptance of a specific 
method, the Court alluded to a generally accepted level of “intellectual 
rigor.”85 
The objective of [the gatekeeping] requirement is to ensure the 
reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain that 
an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or 
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of 
 81. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). 
 82. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 150. 
 83. Id. at 151. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 152. 
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intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field.86  
The Court explained that the issue in Kumho Tire was not the reliability 
of the visual and tactile inspection of tires in general, but the reasonableness 
of using that approach together with the “particular method of analyzing the 
data thereby obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to 
which the expert testimony was directly relevant.”87 Seemingly, the Court 
moved from the extremely flexible approach outlined in Daubert to a Joiner-
style micro-level examination of the expert witness’s methodology. 
In a concurrence joined by Justices O’Connor and Thomas, Justice Scalia 
responded to the majority’s generous language regarding flexibility. Justice 
Scalia warned trial courts that “discretion in choosing the manner of testing 
expert reliability” is neither the discretion to abandon gatekeeping nor the 
discretion to “perform the function inadequately.”88 In both an endorsement 
of the flexible approach and an exhortation to lower courts not to discard the 
Daubert factors lightly, Justice Scalia stressed the bounds of discretion, 
emphasizing that the “Daubert factors are not holy writ, [and] in a particular 
case the failure to apply one or another of them may be unreasonable, and 
hence an abuse of discretion.”89  
IV. POST-KUMHO TIRE REFLECTIONS ON THE PRE-KUMHO TIRE 
TREATMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
In the wake of Kumho Tire, it is useful to look back on lower courts’ 
decisions under Daubert and Joiner regarding the admissibility of 
psychological expert testimony.90 The overarching goal in this Part is to 
determine whether courts could apply similar reasoning to expert testimony 
on battering following Kumho Tire, whether courts are likely to adopt such 
approaches, and whether such approaches should be accepted as reasonably 
within a trial court judge’s discretion.  
The pre-Kumho Tire cases not only delineated between accepted and 
 
 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 154. 
 88. See id. at 158-59 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 89. Id. at 159. Noticeably, the concurring Justices chose not to reinforce the parallel implication 
that the affirmative application of one or another Daubert factor may be unreasonable and an abuse of 
discretion. On one hand, they may have deemed such an assertion unnecessary, as it was implicit in the 
majority opinion. Conversely, the concurring Justices were possibly more concerned with reinforcing 
adherence to the listed factors. 
 
 90. While direct analogies between the various forms of psychological evidence discussed below 
and the specific expertise on domestic violence are somewhat problematic, the lack of case law 
directly addressing the reliability of expert testimony on the effects of battering forces the exercise.  
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rejected approaches to determining the admissibility of expert testimony, but 
they depicted a range of potentially legitimate ways of managing types of 
knowledge outside the “hard” sciences. Though the Kumho Tire Court 
rejected sharp divisions between the “hard” sciences and other expert 
knowledge, it made no declarations about whether “soft” sciences justify 
abbreviated or alternative measures of reliability. It is therefore unclear how 
post-Kumho Tire cases will address concerns regarding the difficulty of 
applying the Daubert factors to social sciences, and how appellate courts will 
respond to evidence of bias in decisions to exclude or include expert 
testimony. 
Below is a comparison of four cases that apply, omit, or adjust the 
Daubert factors.91 Two involve challenges to the admissibility of expert 
testimony regarding victims of child sexual abuse,92 and two involve 
psychological expert testimony in the context of sex-based employment 
discrimination and harassment claims.93 In Gier v. Educational Service Unit 
No. 16,94 the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska (and 
later the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit) limited expert testimony 
about child sexual abuse in the context of a civil action against a school.95 
Gier stands out less for the court’s holding than for the court’s rigid 
adherence to all the Daubert factors and for sweeping dicta about the suspect 
nature of all psychological expert evidence.96 In United States v. Bighead,97 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit allowed rebuttal testimony about 
typical characteristics of child abuse victims without any Daubert analysis.98 
 91. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F. 3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bighead, 
128 F. 3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997); Butler v. Home Depot , 984 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Gier v. 
Educ. Service Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994), aff’d, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 92. United States v. Bighead, 128 F. 3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997); Gier v. Educ. Service Unit No. 16, 
845 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Neb. 1994), aff’d. 66 F.3d. 940 (8th Cir. 1995) 
 93. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co. 130 F. 3d 1287 (8th Cir. 1997); Butler v. Home Depot, 984 F. 
Supp. 1342 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
 94. 845 F. Supp. 1342, 1354 (D. Neb. 1994), aff’d, 66 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Despite the heavy rhetoric, while the court refused to allow the experts to present their 
opinions on whether the children had been abused, the court did allow the experts to testify as to 
general characteristics of children who have been abused. Id. at 1353. 
 97. 128 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 98. In Bighead, the Ninth Circuit held that a therapist’s expert testimony regarding child sexual 
abuse was not subject to a Daubert analysis because the testimony involved “specialized knowledge 
rather than scientific theory.” Id. at 1330. The court likened this testimony to expert testimony on drug 
traffickers’ modus operandi that required no inference derived from a scientific method. Id. The expert 
had never interviewed the alleged victim and her testimony was limited to “typical characteristics she 
has observed among the more than 1300 persons she has interviewed who say they are victims of child 
abuse.” Id. The court held that the “testimony had significant probative value in that it rehabilitated 
(without vouching for) the victim’s credibility after she was cross-examined about the reasons she 
delayed reporting and about the inconsistencies in her testimony.” Id. at 1330-31. In a vigorous dissent 
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In Butler v. Home Depot, an employment discrimination class action suit, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied 
challenges to expert testimony about workplace diversity and sex 
stereotyping after applying the Daubert guidelines with some flexibility.99 In 
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., the Eighth Circuit overruled a Special 
Master’s blanket exclusion of psychological expert testimony regarding 
posttraumatic stress disorder arising from sexual harassment.100 The court 
questioned the fit of the Daubert factors to psychological evidence, but 
nevertheless found the evidence, admissible under a flexible Daubert 
analysis.101 
A. General Acceptance in the Scientific Community, Testability, and Error 
Rates 
Gier illustrates the arbitrary and thus exclusionary potential of the general 
acceptance factor in Daubert. The court’s statement, “The consensus among 
scholars is that there are as yet no scientifically reliable indicators of child 
sexual abuse,”102 is difficult to reconcile with the distinct lack of “consensus” 
among scholars demonstrated by the evidence in the case. Similarly, the 
dissent in Bighead chose a very selective view of the relevant scientific 
“consensus” when considering whether the expert testimony was generally 
accepted.103 Conversely, the Jenson court criticized such limited 
characterizations of the scientific communities’ views.104 
The crux of the disagreement over the application of the Daubert 
guidelines, however, lies in the application of the testability and error rate 
factors. In Gier, the trial court strictly applied the Daubert factor of testability 
and error rate. On one hand, one could view the Gier court’s decision 
severely limiting the expert testimony as narrowly tailored to the court’s 
identification of specific inconsistencies in the professionals’ methods of 
assessing the children involved.105 As the court conceded, “[C]urrent 
to the majority in Bighead, an appellate judge called for the complete exclusion of the testimony. Id. at 
1331 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
 99. 984 F. Supp. 1257, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
 100. 130 F.3d 1287, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 101. See id.  
 102. 845 F. Supp. at 1348 (citations omitted). 
 103. See Bighead, 128 F.3d at 1336 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
 104. See Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1297. 
 
 105. The court in Gier specifically questioned whether the assessment protocol was actually in 
place at the time the assessments were performed, whether the protocol was performed in a uniform 
manner by different practitioners, whether the protocol was sufficient to establish abuse, and whether a 
protocol subjected to peer review for use with nonretarded children could be viewed as reliable when 
used to evaluate retarded children. See 845 F. Supp. at 1349-50. 
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standardized methodologies, if . . . adhered to rigorously, might satisfy the 
Daubert requirements and meet the standards of Rule 702.”106 On the other 
hand, the trial court expressed a high level of distrust for all psychological 
testimony regarding child sexual abuse, and psychological evidence in 
general. 
[N]umerous courts and commentators have expressed concerns about 
the reliability of the type of expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs in 
this case. The underlying suspicions of such testimony is succinctly 
captured by the New Hampshire Supreme Court: “Generally speaking, 
the psychological evaluation of a child suspected of being sexually 
abused is, at best, an inexact science.”107 
While the Gier court disclaimed a sweeping rejection of psychological 
testimony, the court’s criticism of the particular expert evidence suggests a 
potentially broad application, noting that “the general nature of 
psychological testimony in abuse cases casts suspicion on its admissibility 
after Daubert, [but the] case does not cast so broad a net as to encompass all 
such testimony.”108 
Focusing on the theme in Daubert that testibility is the essence of 
scientific knowledge, the Gier court found “[a] further ‘inherent’ difficulty in 
the use of this type of psychological evidence. . . . [I]t ‘is essentially 
“irrefutable,”’ . . . [that] the only way to test it is by proposing theoretical 
explanations for behavior and then testing the theories on patients.”109 The 
Gier court asserted that this “irrefutability” makes such testimony impervious 
to the conventional methods of the adversarial system. The court stated as 
follows: 
The difficulty in refuting the evidence is borne out by the resulting 
inability to cross-examine the witness’ opinion. As in most cases, the 
witnesses’ opinions are based on an interpretation of all of the factors 
before them as opposed to a single indicator or symptom.110 
The Gier court’s statement implies an overly simplistic notion of 
irrefutability. Scientific opinion that takes into account more than one factor 
is not necessarily irrefutable, nor does the fact that an opinion relies on a 
complex set of factors make it immune from attack through cross-
 106. Id. at 1353. 
 107. Id. at 1347 (citations omitted). 
 108. Id. at 1349 (emphasis added). 
 109. Id. at 1348 (citations omitted). 
 110. Id. 
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examination and refutation by another expert.111 
Rather than justifying the application of each Daubert factor based on the 
assertion that social science evidence is just as testable as other forms of 
science,112 the Gier court assumed the relevance of the testability factor at the 
same time that it assumed this factor casts doubt on all expert opinion about 
human behavior. The court discarded the expert opinion by interpreting the 
testability factor as follows: 
As with any case such as this, the psychological techniques employed 
are essentially “untestable” because their “very nature as an opinion as 
to the causes of human behavior, and the fact that the methods for 
testing the results . . . are rife with potential for inaccuracy. Thus, the 
“key question” of testability cannot be conclusively answered.”113 
Expressing a markedly different tone than Gier, the Eighth Circuit in 
Jenson questioned the application of the Daubert factors to the “soft 
sciences.” The court stated: 
There is some question as to whether the Daubert analysis should be 
applied at all to “soft” sciences such as psychology, because there are 
social sciences in which the research, theories and opinions cannot 
have the exactness of hard science methodologies.114 
These doubts aside, the court found the proffered psychological testimony 
to be reliable and relevant under either a Daubert analysis or “the more 
general parameters of Rule 702.”115 The Eighth Circuit cautioned against 
“blanket evidentiary exclusions,” reasoning that Rule 702 is a rule of 
admissibility rather than of exclusion.116 
Decided three months before Bighead, Butler v. Home Depot exemplifies 
 111. Indeed, this reaction against methodologies that consider more than one factor reinforces the 
validity of the concern voiced by Justice Stevens in his dissent in Joiner regarding the exclusion of 
expert testimony premised on a “weighing all the evidence” approach solely because the Court chose 
to evaluate each piece of evidence in isolation. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 153 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 112. See, e.g., Faigman & Wright, supra note 36, at 104. 
 113. 845 F. Supp. at 1351-52 (citing State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1125 (La. 1993)). 
 114. 130 F.3d at 1297. 
 115. Id. at 1297-98. 
 116. See id. at 1298 (citing Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(holding expert testimony on BWS admissible)). Referring to Daubert, the Jenson court stated, “It is 
clear the Court did not intend for a trial judge to automatically exclude relevant evidence if one of 
these conditions was not fully satisfied.” Id. The court also quoted another Eighth Circuit opinion for 
the proposition that “[a] trial court should exclude an expert opinion only if it is so fundamentally 
unsupported that it cannot help the factfinder.” Id. (quoting Hurst v. United States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 
(8th Cir. 1989)). 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p367 rd Michelson.doc  7/17/01   5:22 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
390 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:367 
 
 
 
 
 
a different approach to social science testimony within the Ninth Circuit.117 
The district court held that the Daubert guidelines applied to the testimony of 
social scientists.118 The defendant argued that the testimony of plaintiffs’ four 
expert witnesses was unreliable and irrelevant.119 However, the court 
classified the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske as “scientific” evidence and 
admitted it based on the factors of publication, peer review, testability, and 
general acceptance.120  
[T]he subject matter of Professor Fiske’s testimony is clearly 
“scientific knowledge” within the meaning of Rule 702 and Daubert I. 
In particular, the theories underlying Professor Fiske’s testimony have 
been tested in the laboratory and in the field. In addition, these theories 
have been subjected to peer review and have been published in 
reputable scientific journals. Plaintiffs have furthermore presented 
evidence that the theories in question have been generally accepted by 
experts in the field of psychology. In sum, the Court concludes that the 
scientific basis for Professor Fiske’s expertise is well-established.121 
Notably, the court did not specifically mention the error rate factor.122 
Similarly, the court admitted the testimony of Dr. Bielby, an expert on 
gender stereotyping and sociology, social psychology, and organizational 
behavior, under a Daubert analysis, despite Home Depot challenges to the 
reliability of Dr. Bielby’s testimony.123 The Court rejected Home Depot’s 
“methodological” arguments. It stated: 
 117. The district court cited the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that “[s]pecial concerns arise 
when evaluating the proffer of scientific testimony that do not arise when evaluating the type of 
[nonscientific] expert testimony offered here.” Butler, 984 F. Supp. at 1261 n.3 (quoting Thomas v. 
Newton Int’l Enters., 42 F.3d 1266, 1270 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 118. Id. at 1263 (citing People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 
1997)). The court termed the expertise of one expert to be “specialized knowledge” rather than 
scientific knowledge. See id. at 1260. With regard to this testimony, the court stressed that Daubert is 
flexible and all factors need not apply to every expert. Id. Although the broad distinction between 
specialized and scientific knowledge would not be favored following Kumho Tire, the testimony-
specific application of the Daubert factors would arguably be consistent with Kumho Tire. 
 119. The witnesses’ areas of expertise included organizational diversity program design and 
implementation, social psychology, social relations, stereotyping, sociology, organizational behavior, 
statistics, survey research, and job interests. See Butler, 984 F. Supp. at 1259. Dr. Susan Fiske is the 
expert that testified in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
 120. 984 F. Supp. at 1263.  
 121. Id. (citations omitted). 
 122. See id.  
 123. 984 F. Supp. at 1265. Home Depot asserted “that Professor Bielby dr[e]w sweeping 
conclusions based on his selected review of deposition testimony. In addition, Home Depot argue[d] 
that Professor Bielby’s testimony [wa]s unreliable because he ha[d] not reviewed applicant flow data, 
examined specific personnel decisions, or controlled for other factors which might explain any gender 
disparity.” Id.  
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Like Professor Fiske, Professor Bielby does not contend that he has 
conducted a systematic survey of female applicants’ or employees’ 
career interests based on a random sample; instead, he proffers his 
conclusions based on a limited set of information. To the extent that 
Professor Bielby offers conclusions which lack foundation, Home 
Depot may attack such statements through vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and requests for 
limiting instructions.124 
These pre-Kumho Tire cases do not merely depict a circuit split regarding 
whether the Daubert factors apply to psychological expert testimony at all. 
Instead, the more prominent debate even prior to Kumho Tire centered on the 
type of reliability screening required by Daubert, specifically the utility of 
the testability and error rate factors. 
B. The Question of Bias 
The risk of bias in admissibility determinations exists at two levels. On a 
macroscopic level, the Daubert standard is arguably biased against 
nonscientific knowledge.125 On the microscopic level individual judges could 
strictly apply the Daubert factors to exclude expert testimony about human 
behavior when such testimony conflicts with their socio-political views. 
Significantly, these two levels can act together to disadvantage doubly expert 
evidence regarding human behavior. As the cases suggest, expert evidence 
on human behavior is inherently vulnerable to judicial political opposition in 
a way that testimony from the hard sciences is not, at least in the aggregate. 
This becomes particularly clear in light of the explicit use of social science 
testimony to counter popular myths and prejudices.  
A few examples highlight the significance of the bias concern. In Gier, 
the district court relied upon highly controversial critiques of expertise on 
child sexual abuse to support statements about the lack of any reliability in 
the field.126 The dissent in Bighead drew an analogy between allegations of 
incest and the Salem witch trials, arguing that: “‘the general characteristics’” 
of children believed to be under the spell of a witch were the principal 
evidence that witchcraft had taken place.”127 Reaching far beyond the issue 
before the court, the dissent made sweeping statements about the validity of 
 124. Id. (citations omitted). 
 125. See Jasanoff, supra note 17. 
 126. See 845 F. Supp. at 1349 n.13 (citing RICHARD A. GARDNER, M.D., SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA, 
SALEM WITCH TRIALS REVISITED (1991)). 
 127. 128 F.3d at 1337 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
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claims based on repressed memories and satanic ritual child abuse.128 Even 
more striking, the dissenting judge expressed discomfort with the “current 
climate” and “cultural changes” in a thinly veiled diatribe against the 
changing gender relationships that have made possible reevaluations of 
sexual violence. The dissent stated, “In this America of the so-called sexual 
revolution, traditional restraints have tended to be displaced by a kind of new 
puritanism. At the same time being a victim has become a popular calling; 
the most strategic role is that of victim.”129 Particularly vitriolic is the 
dissent’s apparent attack on any acknowledgment of child sexual abuse, 
much less the existence of expertise in assessing and treating child sexual 
abuse.  
It is in the context of these cultural changes that statutes of limitations 
have been altered to benefit the delayed disclosures of childhood 
sexual abuse, that a journal has appeared with the title Journal of 
Child Sexual Abuse, and that those who have complained of such 
abuse are identified by their therapists as “victims” or, more 
dramatically, as “survivors.”130 
In contrast, in Home Depot, the judge refused an invitation to act on bias. 
Quoting the defendant’s motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, 
the court highlighted defendant’s sexually-laden attack on the witness’s 
competence and objectivity: “‘[T]he union of plaintiffs’ counsel and Fiske as 
co-authors of the report suggests that it is more akin to the product of a 
bordello than a research laboratory.’”131 Jenson, on the other hand, offers a 
rare insight into the existence of bias so blatant as to draw open disapproval. 
The Eighth Circuit found the Special Master’s evidentiary ruling constituted 
an abuse of the broad discretion granted by the Supreme Court in Joiner.132 
 128. Like the court in Gier, the dissent in Bighead cited literature that represented one pole in the 
spectrum of psychological authorities writing on repressed memories and ritual abuse. See 128 F.3d at 
1337-38 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing GARDNER, supra note 126; RICHARD OFSHE & ETHAN 
WATTERS, MAKING MONSTERS: FALSE MEMORIES, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SEXUAL HYSTERIA 
(1994)). The dissenting judge also called into doubt the expert witness’s objectivity based on the fact 
that she was the forensic director of the Children’s Advocacy Center, “a position oriented to achieving 
results for the Advocacy Center in the courts.” 128 F.3d at 1336. Scrutinizing the witness’s 
employment at an agency that specifically addressed child abuse is not particularly relevant to 
objectivity. Indeed, under such reasoning, expertise in child abuse would in and of itself make the 
expert suspect. 
 129. 128 F.3d. at 1337-38. 
 130. Id. at 1338 (emphasis added). 
 131. 984 F. Supp. at 1263 n.9 (citing Defendant’s Motion to Exclude Fiske Testimony at 10) 
(emphasis added). 
 132. Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1297 n.15. 
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The Eighth Circuit’s frank commentary on the bias exhibited by the Special 
Master is striking: 
Upon a reading of the record, ineluctably we are led to conclude that 
the Special Master’s exclusion of this testimony did not rest upon any 
recognized area of discretion. The record strongly suggests the Special 
Master foreclosed consideration of the evidence based on his own 
preconceived notions relating to psychiatric proof. The Special Master 
did not attempt to hide his hostility toward psychological evidence in 
sexual harassment claims, stating: “‘Experts’. . . know no more than 
judges about what causes mental changes--which is to say that they 
know almost nothing.”133 
The court further noted its “disapprov[al] of such categorical exclusions by 
the same Special Master in a prior sexual harassment case which ‘unfairly 
prevented’ proof of plaintiff’s claim.”134 Taken together, these cases suggest 
that the danger of bias in admissibility determinations has not been an idle 
consideration, particularly in the arena of sex-based violence. 
In sum, although Kumho Tire clearly mandates some application of the 
Daubert guidelines to all expert testimony, it would be overly simplistic to 
conclude that the rigid approach adopted in Gier prevailed. Rather, Gier 
represents one approach lower courts may choose after Kumho Tire, once at 
odds with the principle of flexibility espoused in Kumho Tire and, to some 
extent, protected by the abuse of discretion standard enunciated in Joiner. 
Taken on its own terms, Gier did not commit itself to one unequivocal 
approach. On one hand, the court made strong statements suggestive of a 
general distrust of psychological testimony regarding the sexual abuse of 
children. On the other hand, the court’s ruling was based on findings of 
specific inconsistencies in the expert evidence. Moreover, while the Eighth 
Circuit solidly affirmed Gier,135 it offered a much different approach to 
determining the reliability of expert testimony in Jenson. More important 
 133. Id. at 1297. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit found that the Special Master “made two 
questionable observations.” Id. at 1296. “First, the court found: ‘There is, therefore, no scientifically 
developed psychiatric model or procedure for determining whether a particular stress caused a 
particular symptom or mental state.” Id. at 1296-97. Then the Special Master also found that from the 
“unanimous testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists, called by both sides, . . . there is no scientific 
method for determining the cause of a mental disorder or for allocating proportionate cause when more 
than one possible cause exists.” Id. at 1297. The Eighth Circuit observed that “[i]ronically, the Special 
Master, . . . generally accepted the opinions of the expert witnesses produced by the defendants. The 
imbalance in its rulings is difficult to explain.” Id. 
 134. Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1298 (citations omitted). 
 135. “The analysis that the District Court conducted is precisely the type of analysis the decision 
in Daubert contemplates.” Gier v. Educ. Service Unit No. 16, 66 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1995).  
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than representing two views on whether Daubert applies at all, these pre-
Kumho Tire decisions represent divergent views on how Daubert should 
apply, that is, they offer strikingly different perspectives on whether such 
testimony is potentially reliable and what approaches are relevant to 
determining its reliability.136 
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TREATMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
REGARDING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FOLLOWING KUMHO TIRE 
Whereas the pre-Kumho Tire battles often centered on whether courts 
were obliged to conduct a Daubert-style reliability analysis, the post-Kumho 
Tire debates will likely center on the form of the reliability inquiry.137 At 
base, Kumho Tire does little to resolve substantive disagreements about the 
proper content of reliability determinations. This Part looks at how courts are 
applying Kumho Tire to social science evidence to identify trends relevant to 
expert testimony on domestic violence. The variety of post-Kumho Tire 
 136. Commentators and judges provide conflicting judgments regarding the flexibility with which 
the courts are applying the Daubert factors. See Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th 
Cir. 1998). See also Krebs & De Tray, supra note 22. 
 In Moore, the dissent wrote a scathing critique of what it characterized as the majority opinion’s 
“insistence on an inflexible, unthinking application of the Daubert factors to expert opinions based on 
knowledge and methodology outside the realm of hard science.” Moore, 151 F.3d at 283. The dissent 
cited cases from other circuits taking a more flexible approach. See, e.g., Tyus v. Urban Search 
Management, 102 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996). In Tyus, the court held that, at a general level, the Daubert 
framework was appropriate for all kinds of expert testimony. Id. at 263. Specifically regarding the 
framework for assessing the admissibility of social science expert testimony, the Tyus court stated:  
It is true, of course, that the measure of intellectual rigor will vary by the field of expertise and the 
way of demonstrating expertise will also vary. Furthermore, we agree with the implication . . . that 
genuine expertise may be based on experience or training. In all cases, however, the district court 
must ensure that it is dealing with an expert, not just a hired gun. 
Id. Notably, the advisory committee’s note to Rule 702 cites both Moore and Tyus with approval. See 
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (2000). 
 
 137. In the various admissibility determinations examined here, whether the courts adopted a 
flexible or rigid Daubert analysis, experts were often precluded from offering opinions as to the 
specific application of their theory in the context of the case. United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 
(10th Cir. 1999), offers an interesting note on the influence Kumho Tire will have on limiting 
instructions. In Charley, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed a trial court’s ruling on 
the admissibility of the testimony of pediatricians and mental health counselors regarding alleged child 
sexual abuse. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a 
physician to testify to general and conditional opinions relaying that (1) a “normal physical 
examination is not necessarily inconsistent with a history of sexual abuse” and (2) the alleged victim’s 
atypical history of physical complaints could possibly be explained by a unifying diagnosis of physical 
or sexual abuse. 189 F.3d at 1263. Declining to address the defense’s argument “that these ‘consistent 
with’ statements were admitted by the district court without any kind of reliability finding, as required 
by Daubert and Kumho Tire,” because the issue was raised for the first time on appeal, the court 
explained: “[W]e do not purport to make any kind of independent appellate determination that such 
‘consistent with’ statements—or any other statements, for that matter—pass muster under Daubert or 
Kumho Tire.” 189 F.3d at 1265 n.16. 
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determinations of the admissibility of psychological or social science expert 
testimony reflects the tension in Kumho Tire between the mandate to apply 
the Daubert guidelines and the endorsement of Daubert’s flexibility. 
Applying Kumho Tire to an expert’s opinion on the psychology of 
eyewitness identification and handwriting analysis, the Court, in United 
States v. Hines,138 identified the “mixed messages” coming from the 
Supreme Court. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
stated: 
To some, Daubert/Kumho Tire have considerably raised the bar for 
the admissibility of expert testimony. In some ways that is true; in 
some ways it is not. It is true that Daubert/Kumho Tire have focused a 
great deal of attention on the judge’s role as a gatekeeper for expert 
testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 104(a). To the extent that there is more 
pre-trial review of expert testimony, there are bound to be more 
exclusions. In other ways, however, the impact of Daubert/Kumho 
Tire has been the opposite—opening the door to testimony previously 
excluded.139 
The Massachusetts district court interpreted Kumho Tire to call into 
question techniques which previous courts had assumed were reliable.140 The 
Hines court found the expert testimony on handwriting analysis particularly 
vulnerable to the reliability inquiry suggested in Kumho Tire. The court 
opined: 
If I were to give special emphasis to “general acceptance” or to treat 
Daubert/Kumho Tire as calling for a rigorous analysis only of new 
technical fields, not traditional ones, then handwriting analysis would 
largely pass muster. Handwriting analysis is perhaps the prototype of a 
technical field regularly admitted into evidence. But, if I were to apply 
the Daubert/Kumho Tire standards rigorously, looking for such things  
 138. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999). 
 139. Id. at 64. 
 140. The court stated: 
Again, a mixed message: Apply Daubert to technical fields, even though the scientific method 
may not really fit, but be flexible. Moreover, in this setting, because few technical fields are as—
firmly established as traditional scientific ones, the new science/old science comparison is less 
clear. The Court is plainly inviting a reexamination even of “generally accepted” venerable, 
technical fields. 
Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 
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as empirical testing, rate of error, etc., the testimony would have serious 
problems.141 
Nevertheless, the court did not find that the weaknesses in the 
handwriting analysis testimony required its complete exclusion.142 The court 
admitted the handwriting analysis testimony to the extent the expert restricted 
the testimony to the similarities and differences between the handwriting 
specimens and did not offer on an ultimate conclusion.143 In contrast, the 
court found that expert testimony on the psychology of eyewitness 
identification easily passed muster under the new standards.144 Further, the 
Hines court reasoned that eyewitness identification testimony assisted the 
trier of fact by drawing an analogy to testimony about BWS.145  
[T]he rationale for the [eyewitness identification] testimony tracks that 
for battered women syndrome experts. The jury, for example, may 
fault the victim for not leaving an abusive spouse, believing that they 
are fully capable of putting themselves in the shoes of the defendant. 
In fact, psychological evidence suggests that the “ordinary” response 
of an “ordinary” woman are not in play in situations of domestic 
violence where the victim suffers from “battered woman syndrome.” 
Common sense inferences thus may be well off the mark.146 
In Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Packaging,147 the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit required that any psychiatric testimony given to conform 
to the methodology and rigor generally accepted in the field.148 The 
 141. Id. at 68 (emphasis added). 
 142. The court explained: 
[The handwriting expert’s] account of what is similar or not similar in the handwriting of Hines 
and the robber can be understood and evaluated by the jury. The witness can be cross examined, 
as she was about why this difference was not considered consequential, while this difference was, 
and the jury can draw their own conclusions. This is not rocket science, or higher math. 
Id. at 70. 
 143. Id.  
 144. The court stated:  
Unlike handwriting analysis, there is no question as to the scientific underpinnings of [the 
psychology of eyewitness identification] testimony. They are based on experimental 
psychological studies, testing the acquisition of memory, retention, and retrieval of memory under 
different conditions. Indeed, the central debate before the jury, eloquently articulated by [the 
government’s expert] is the polar opposite of the debate in the handwriting field—whether 
conclusions obtained in an experimental, academic, setting with college students should be applied 
to a real life setting.  
Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 72. 
 145. Id. at 64-65. 
 146. Id. at 72 (citation omitted). 
 147. 188 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 
 148. Id. at 617-18.  
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defendant argued that the trial court impermissibly admitted a psychiatrist’s 
opinion on the plaintiff’s post-traumatic stress disorder and depression 
brought on by sexually harassing conduct without requiring the establishment 
of a proper foundation under Daubert.149 Noting the gatekeeping obligation 
imposed by Daubert and Kumho Tire, the court reasoned that Kumho Tire 
permitted a flexibile inquiry and recognized the trial court’s broad 
discretion.150 The court approved the district court’s fact-specific 
determination to ensure that the experts exercise the “same level of 
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant 
field.”151  
In United States v. Romero,152 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit further demonstrated that the flexibility and broad discretion given to 
trial court judges in Daubert/Kumho Tire, could overcome the exclusionary 
possibilities of the reliability inquiry. In Romero, the plaintiff challenged the 
admissibility of expert testimony from an FBI agent as to the characteristics 
and methods of child molesters. 153 The court reviewed the trial court’s 
reliability inquiry, which was based on the expert’s experience, the witness’s 
status as an expert in his field, and to some extent on the fact that the expert 
had described the traits to which he was testifying “in published materials 
long before the Romero case.”154  
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that Kumho Tire requires courts to the 
apply the Daubert analysis to nonscientific expert evidence, but emphasized 
that the specific list of factors in Daubert need not apply in every case.155 
 149. Id. at 617. 
 150. Id. at 618. “But whether Daubert’s suggested indicia of reliability apply to any given 
testimony depends on the nature of the issue at hand, the witness’s particular expertise, and the subject 
of the testimony.” 
 151. Id. (citing Kumho Tire). The district court in this case did not deviate from that standard. Dr. 
House [a psychiatrist who evaluated the plaintiff] testified to his experience, to the criteria by which he 
diagnosed Skidmore, and to standard methods of diagnosis in his field. Absent any indication that Dr. 
House’s testimony amounted to the sort of “junk science” Daubert blocks, we see no abuse of 
discretion in the district court’s admitting the testimony. Id. 
 152. 189 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 153. The trial court excluded from the agent’s testimony his opinion about the defendant’s intent 
or culpability. Id. at 582. 
 154. Id. at 583. Specifically, the trial court stated: 
There was not any question really in my mind as to the propriety of his testimony as a general 
matter . . . highly relevant and, in fact, in my judgment, superior to, I think, someone who might 
offer some psychiatric testimony along the lines of characteristics and what people do and do not 
do given certain characteristics and impulses . . . Here is a man who studied the field extensively, 
an acknowledged expert in the field. And I do not think there is any question whatever that his 
testimony . . . is particularly helpful to the jury because he has an abundance of training and 
experience far beyond any lay person, certainly, and far beyond, I think, most experts in the field. 
Id. at 582 (emphasis added). 
 
 155. Id. at 584. 
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Hence, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the need for specific consideration of 
the expert’s underlying methods in terms of testability, error rates, or peer 
review. The Court rejected as “baseless” the defense’s claims that the 
testimony was neither sufficiently reliable nor helpful to the jury for two 
separate reasons.156 First, the court relied on precedent for the use of similar 
modus operandi evidence to show “how seemingly innocent conduct . . . 
could be part of a seduction technique.”157 Second, the court emphasized that 
such testimony would be helpful to a jury with little background for 
understanding the complex ways in which child molesters operate.158  
A number of the cases following Kumho Tire that address psychological 
testimony highlight the interplay between an expert’s general qualifications 
and his or her specific qualifications to offer an opinion on the issue at 
hand.159 There is a fine line between the preliminary question of whether a 
witness qualifies as an expert at all and a court’s exploration of the scope of a 
witness’s expertise. For example, in Smith v. Rasmussen,160 the plaintiff 
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and a Due Process claim against the Iowa 
Department of Human Services for denying his request for Medicaid benefits 
for sex reassignment surgery.161 The court excluded the State’s proffered 
expert testimony concerning the nature and effectiveness of sex reassignment 
surgery and whether the plaintiff could be diagnosed with gender identity 
disorder because the State’s expert lacked familiarity with these topics.162 
Similarly, in Olsen v. Marriott International, Inc.,163 an Arizona district 
court confronted a large gap in the expert witness’s area of knowledge and 
 156. Id.  
 157. 189 F. 3d at 585. 
 158. Id. Notably, Romero suggests the re-emergence of the reasoning of the majority in Bighead, 
despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit in Bighead had held Daubert inapplicable, whereas the Seventh 
Circuit in Romero discussed and applied Daubert/Kumho Tire. 
 159. See, e.g., Smith v. Resmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999); Olsen v. Marriot Int’l, 
Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999).  
 160. 57 F. Supp. 2d 736 (N.D. Iowa 1999). 
 161. Id. at 740.  
 162. 
Although Dr. Kavalier plainly has adequate education, training, and experience in general 
psychiatry to render opinions based on general psychiatric principles, just as plainly he lacks any 
first-hand “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” in the treatment of gender identity 
disorder, and thus lacks any qualification to render an opinion on diagnosis or treatment of that 
disorder. In other words, Dr. Kavalier’s testimony lacks “a reliable basis in the knowledge and 
experience of [the relevant] discipline,” which is not just general psychiatry, but the diagnosis and 
treatment of gender identity disorder.  
Id. at 766 (citations omitted). In contrast, plaintiff’s expert was a psychiatrist with an extensive 
background treating patients with gender identity disorder over the past twenty-seven years. See id. at 
769.  
 163. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999). 
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her testimony. In Olsen, a male massage therapist sued the defendant hotel 
under Title VII, claiming that the defendant refused to consider him for the 
position of a massage therapist because of his gender.164 The defendant 
offered testimony from an expert in gender roles and the effects of sexual 
abuse.165 Although the court found the expert was qualified and her general 
information on gender roles and sexual abuse was reliable, the court held that 
the defendant failed to establish the reliability of the expert’s opinion about 
the impact of gender roles and sexual abuse on “the massage experience.”166 
VI. PREDICTIONS FOR THE TREATMENT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AFTER KUMHO TIRE 
Obviously, this collection of disparate cases does not suggest one clear 
outcome for the admissibility of expert testimony on the effects of battering 
after Kumho Tire. Indeed, rather than searching for the one likely approach to 
such testimony that will arise from Kumho Tire, it is more appropriate to 
highlight the wide variety of responses likely to come from federal courts. 
What is clear is that the Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire line of cases 
should not result in the complete exclusion of this body of knowledge from 
the courtroom.  
The reasoning of the court in Hines generally suggests that this district 
court would consider the current state of the methodology underpinning 
expert testimony on the effects of battering to be sufficiently reliable as to be 
admissible. First, the Hines court explicitly endorsed the use of BWS on the 
issue of whether such testimony assists the trier of fact.167 Second, in contrast 
to the decision in Gier, the Hines court indicated that psychological research, 
in and of itself, is not suspect under Daubert.168 Rather, the court expressed a 
tolerance for allowing debate about the meaning of psychological research to 
occur in front of the jury.169 However, the type of psychological research 
examined in Hines differs from the psychological research on domestic 
violence. Unlike psychological research on eye witness identification, 
research on domestic violence cannot generally be performed in laboratory 
 164. Id. at 1056.  
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1057. Additionally, the court held that the defendant failed to establish the reliability of 
portions of the expert’s report by failing to provide full citations to referenced studies and by failing to 
provide evidence regarding the reliability of those studies. Id. The court also found the testimony 
irrelevant considering the defendant’s argument that being female was a bona fide occupational 
qualification for the position. Id. 
 167. United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 72 (D. Mass. 1999).  
 168. See id.  
 169. See id. at 73.  
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settings with college students. Outside of the laboratory, the determination of 
error rates is more complicated, if not impossible. Nonetheless, the loss of 
such measures in field research must be balanced by the gains of assessing 
the phenomenon of domestic violence in a more authentic setting. The 
general thrust of Hines implies that Kumho Tire allows such balancing. 
Skidmore also bodes well for the admissibility of expert testimony on the 
dynamics of battering in the Fifth Circuit. The court rejected a rigid 
application of the specific Daubert factors in favor of a focus on whether the 
expert’s criteria and methodology are of the level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the appropriate field of knowledge.170 
In comparison, Romero does to provide clear guidance as to the Seventh 
Circuit’s treatment of expert testimony on the effects of battering. On one 
hand, Romero sets forth an extremely flexible application of Kumho Tire that 
would assure the admissibility of expert testimony on domestic violence, 
given a qualified expert. On the other hand, the trial court’s stated preference 
for the testimony of an FBI agent over that of a psychiatrist, implies a distrust 
of psychological expert testimony and suggests a danger of bias for 
testimony regarding domestic violence. 
The interplay between the preliminary question of a witness’s 
qualifications as an expert and a court’s determination of the proper scope of 
the expert’s expertise, exhibited in Rasmussen and Olsen suggests another 
danger. Courts may severly limit expert witnesses’ testimony about domestic 
violence because of their microscopic views of exactly which aspects of an 
opinion are based on a sufficient foundation.171 Conversely, the close 
examination of a witness’s relevant experience in the specific area at issue 
could reduce distortions about the nature of scientific knowledge regarding 
domestic violence that results when mental health professionals 
inexperienced in the field testify about BWS.172 
Finally, the debates expressed in the cases preceding Kumho Tire have 
largely retained their vitality in a way that will surely impact admissibility 
determinations regarding expert testimony on the effects of battering. The 
Eighth Circuit’s affirmation of Gier’s rigid application of the Daubert 
 170. See Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Pleg., Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 171. On this count, it would be interesting to explore the court’s exclusion of specific testimony in 
Charley, where the court excluded testimony of licensed mental health counselors proffering that the 
children’s symptoms were more consistent with children who have been sexually abused than with 
symptoms of children who have witnessed abuse of their mother, reasoning that there was insufficient 
foundation for such an opinion. 189 F.3d at 1269. 
 172. However, this possibility implicates an underlying problem regarding a lack of resources, not 
the least of which are geographic limitations on the availability of psychologists and psychiatrists with 
current, specialized expertise in domestic violence. 
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factors, standing alongside its flexible Daubert analysis in Jenson, defies 
simple predictions for domestic violence expert testimony in the Eighth 
Circuit. However, the flexible Daubert analysis applied to social science 
testimony in Jenson and Butler present a legitimate model for the treatment 
of expert testimony on the effects of battering. Nonetheless, the hostility 
against any expertise related to sexual victimization, expressed by the 
dissenting judge in Bighead and by the Special Master in Jenson, stands for 
the danger that judicial bias against expertise on domestic violence will infect 
at least some admissibility determinations both at the trial court and the 
appellate levels. In this vein, a distinct risk remains that new approaches to 
the gatekeeping role will disadvantage battered women in the federal court 
system.173 In response to this risk, parties offering expert testimony on the 
effects of battering can reduce their vulnerability by ensuring that their expert 
witnesses have specific expertise in the field of domestic violence and are 
well versed in the most rigorous research available in the field.174 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The key question following Kumho Tire is how helpful the Daubert 
factors are in establishing the reliability of expert testimony regarding 
domestic violence. The answer to this question should come from the 
disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, social work, and the like. Otherwise, 
courts may increasingly exclude useful expert testimony on the effects of 
battering following Kumho Tire. Accusations that expertise on the effects of 
battering is “junk science” may very well increase. The special status 
afforded the methodology of the “hard” sciences in Daubert combined with 
broad judicial discretion to exclude expert testimony based on an inquiry into 
the relationship between methodologies and conclusions heightens the risk of 
such challenges.  
Yet, as the cases discussed above suggest, the Daubert, Joiner, and 
 173. The state courts may remain something of a “safe haven” from any negative effects of 
Kumho Tire on the admissibility of expert testimony on domestic violence. Decided by the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia less than two weeks before Kumho Tire, Nixon v. United States 
rejected a challenge that characterized expert testimony on BWS as “junk science.” 728 A.2d 582, 589 
(D.C. 1999). Cf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Commonwealth v. 
Crawford, 706 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Mass. 1999) (holding that expert testimony on BWS was relevant and 
helpful to the jury). In Morgan, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin 
overruled a trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony on the defendant’s posttraumatic stress disorder 
based on Wisconsin law. Notably, Wisconsin law did not premise admissibility on a distinct factor of 
reliability. Id. at 1011. 
 
 174. Such an approach would have the two-fold advantage of increasing the likelihood of 
admissibility, and reducing distortions and stereotypic portrayals of battered women sometimes 
proferred by expert witnesses less versed in the field. 
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Kumho Tire line of cases represent a highly indeterminate standard.175 
Because of the inherent indeterminacy and the broad latitude for discretion, 
the same battles that were ostensibly resolved by Kumho Tire’s wide 
application of Daubert have already begun to resurface. On the one hand, 
Kumho Tire may have an exclusionary effect in some courts, based less on 
the entirety of the opinion than on the impression that the Court’s mandate 
that a Daubert analysis be applied to the social sciences tends to strengthen 
the exclusionary force of Rule 702. On the other hand, a trend toward the 
exclusion of expert testimony on the effects of battering is not inevitable 
under Kumho Tire, as the court’s opinion itself confirms that a Daubert 
analysis is not the sum of the Daubert factors.  
Michelle Michelson* 
 175. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 22 (reasoning that a creative articulation of the purpose for 
which expert testimony is being offered can circumvent the need for laying a foundation). 
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